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INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
The Independent Corporate Board:
A Means to What End?
Roberta S. Karmel*
I. Introduction
The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project has
provoked intense controversy from its inception. Even its name
has changed because of this controversy, from Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommenda-
tions' to Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations.2 The evolution of provisions relating to the
structure and composition of corporate boards of directors illus-
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1. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Draft No.
I].
2. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Draft No. 2].
The Forward to Tentative Draft No. 2 makes it clear that the change in the Project's
title:
was made to allay the fear that courts might be misled by the traditional
word "Restatement" in the title to view the entire document as purporting
to restate existing law .... In addition, black letter recommendations
with respect to corporation law are no longer preceded by the words "Cor-
porate law should provide" because the word "provide" was thought by
some to imply a call for legislative as distinguished from judicial imple-
mentation, contrary in many instances to the intention of the formulation.
Finally, in view of the concern that readers would not grasp the import
of the distinction between black letter statements with respect to law and
statements about "good corporate practice" and also that the possible legal
significance of practice recommendations was unclear, such recommenda-
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trates that underlying the controversy are questions about the
very need for and purpose of the Project. These questions are un-
likely to die down merely because of a name change.
This Article examines and critiques the general and specific
background of the ALI's provisions on board structure. Part II
traces the general historical debate on corporate governance and
the development of the concepts underlying the ALI's provisions.
Part III examines the history of proposals regarding board struc-
ture and director independence. Part IV discusses the develop-
ment of the ALI's proposals for independent boards of directors,
reviewing the provisions in Tentative Draft No. 1, 3 then setting
forth and analyzing the criticisms that led to the changed language
in Tentative Draft No. 2.4 Part IV then criticizes both the provi-
sions and the monitoring model that underlies them.
The Article concludes that there is not an adequate legal frame-
work, nor a political consensus for proposing changes in existing
corporate law that would require a board composed primarily of
independent directors. Moreover, the ALI has not examined nor
propounded a theoretical basis for changing corporate law to man-
date the form of board structure recommended.
II. The Corporate Governance Debate
Two schools of thought have long been debated in American
thinking about business corporations. One school views corpora-
tion law as basically private law and corporate governance as in-
volving the definition of relationships, under theories of trust law,
between corporate managers and shareholders.5 Another school
considers corporation law as a matter of public law because the
states grant charters to corporations and because managers are re-
sponsible not only to shareholders but to other constituencies as
well.6 Competition between federal and state jurisprudence, and
economic and political pressures, have caused American corpora-
tion law to ricochet between these two schools.
In the early years of the republic, state law required that corpo-
rate charters include various substantive protections for share-
holders, particularly with regard to capital structure.7 These laws,
tions are no longer printed in black letter and even the adjective "good"
has been eliminated from the formulation....
IM at vii-viii.
3. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, §§ 3.03-3.08, at 71, 125.
4. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, §§ 3.04-3.10, at 83-124.
5. R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION xiii-xiv (1979).
6. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE COR-
PORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 71-73,
207-09 (1976).
7. See E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, 310-11 (1954).
however, contained no requirements for any particular board com-
position. The rather scanty federal jurisprudence that existed
tended to analyze corporate law as a matter of contract between
the state and corporate owners.8 In the late nineteenth century,
state corporation laws requiring substantive fairness were largely
repealed, probably in response to the national economic interest as
well as to state needs for taxes. The charter-mongering move-
ment of the period, sometimes denigrated as a "race for the bot-
tom" for legal standards,9 permitted almost unlimited freedom in
the incorporation of new enterprises. The Supreme Court's recog-
nition that a corporation was a "person"'10 encouraged interstate
companies to use state incorporation laws to further the develop-
ment of large national business enterprises. Shareholder protec-
tion became primarily a matter of judicially imposed fairness or
fiduciary standards. The only other law that affected corporate
governance was clearly private, embodied in the listing require-
ments of the New York Stock Exchange."
Trust and contract law concepts were intertwined in the devel-
opment of corporate law. The law viewed shareholders as the ac-
tual owners of a corporation and saw managers as their agents,
entrusted with managing corporate assets for their benefit. This
relationship required corporate managers to concentrate upon pe-
cuniary gain rather than public good.' 2 The same motives pre-
vailed among boards of directors because managers generally also
served as directors, and nonmanagement directors tended to be
financiers or bankers. Therefore, because corporation law pro-
vided that "the business of a corporation shall be managed under
the direction of its board of directors,"' 3 the law elevated share-
holders' gain over public welfare. No notion of independence as a
beneficial qualification for directors had emerged.
The stock market crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great De-
pression of the 1930s brought more radical theories about corpora-
tions to the public's attention. In 1931 and 1932 the Berle-Dodd
8. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
627 (1819) (contract clause of the Constitution prohibits unilateral legislative change
in public charter issued to Dartmouth College).
9. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 666 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cary, Federalism].
10. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
11. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) first adopted its listing agreement,
traditionally a principal means by which it enforces its listing standards, in 1899. That
agreement and the policies set forth in the NYSE Company Manual have developed
gradually over the years. They impose a wide variety of corporate governance re-
quirements for initial and continued listing. Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977), 11 SEC Docket 1945, 1946 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Release No. 13,346]. The NYSE became subject to regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934. In 1975, amendments to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 gave the SEC new powers to approve, modify, and enforce NYSE
rules. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 16, 17(1)-(2), 89 Stat.
97, 146, 154 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s, 78u(d)-(e)). Whether these new
powers give the SEC authority to change NYSE listing requirements is uncertain.
12. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
13. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
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debate' 4 about corporate governance formed a backdrop for
sweeping reform legislation by the New Deal, including the first
federal securities laws. Professor Berle hypothesized that stock-
holders had surrendered control of the corporation to manage-
ment. He advocated returning control of corporate affairs to the
stockholders through the enforcement of fiduciary duties owed
them by managers.' 5 By contrast, Professor Dodd took the more
radical position that the state should regulate the absolute control
of corporate property exercised by corporate managers not only
on behalf of shareholders but for society at large. Professor Dodd
felt that the passive property interests of stockholders should
yield to the larger interests of society, including employees and
the community.16 This "managerialist" view led some political ac-
tivists to propose federal chartering of public corporations in order
to compel corporations to be more responsive to labor and other
constituencies.'7
Both Professors Dodd and Berle argued by analogy, comparing
large publicly held corporations with governmental agencies.' 8
Professor Dodd viewed corporations as autocratic merchant states
that nevertheless derived their power from the government and
therefore had to be brought under control by the government for
the benefit of the populace at large.19 Professor Berle, on the
other hand, stressed the analogy between corporate governance
and parliamentary democracy and was more concerned with mak-
14. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931)
[hereinafter cited as Berle, Corporate Powers]; Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Man-
agers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Dodd, Corporate
Managers]; Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Berle, Corporate Managers]; Dodd, Is Effective
Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L.
REV. 194 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Dodd, Effective Enforcement].
15. Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 14, at 1049.
16. Dodd, Corporate Managers, supra note 14, at 1156.
17. See, e.g., Federal Licensing of Corporations: Hearings on S. 10 and S. 3072
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 351
(1938); Federal Licensing of Corporations: Hearings on S. 10 Before the Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937) (hearings on bills,
introduced by Senators Borah and Mahoney, that would have required corporations
with substantial gross assets and engaged in interstate commerce to obtain federal
licensing); see also R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGuAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPO-
RATION (1976); Cary, Federalism, supra note 9, at 702; Schwartz, A Case for Federal
Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976). Justice Lewis Brandeis also
favored the concession theory that corporations exist by virtue of a grant from the
sovereign. He argued that the state should limit corporate power because large corpo-
rations threatened democracy. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49
(1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18. Berle, Corporate Managers, supra note 14, at 1368; Dodd, Effective Enforce-
men4 supra note 14, at 203-04.
19. Dodd, Corporate Managers, supra note 14, passim.
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ing corporations responsive to the economic interests of
stockholders.20
The Securities Act of 193321 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193422 basically followed Professor Berle's theory. In federalizing
state corporation law, Congress was only able or willing to require
disclosure to investors,23 independent auditors for public compa-
nies,24 and improvements in the proxy machinery to promote fair
corporate suffrage and to curtail management's dominance of the
proxy process.25
Nevertheless, many powerful voices continued to argue for the
view that corporate managers should be made accountable *to the
public at large by controlling access to the capital markets and
regulating corporate structure by federal statute. For example,
Justice William 0. Douglas, who exercised considerable influence
upon federal corporation law jurisprudence by virtue of his posi-
tion first as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and then as Justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote:
Both prior to and during my SEC days, I had promoted the
idea of having "public" directors of our large corporations....
The reason was that, by and large, directors tend to become sub-
servient to the management, courteously serving its interests,
which are not necessarily consistent with the interest of stock-
holders or compatible with the public reputation of the com-
pany .... [A]t least some of the directors of our large
corporations must not be subservient to management. This was
a policy which the SEC had power to enforce.26
Although Justice Douglas and other proponents of independent
boards were not, in fact, able to institute the requirement gener-
ally for public corporations through either amendments to the
federal securities laws or interpretations of those laws, they in-
jected their corporate governance ideas into discrete areas. The
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193527 imposed various
substantive controls upon capital structure. More significantly for
the future, the Investment Company Act of 194028 created a corpo-
rate governance structure that required a fixed percentage of in-
dependent directors. 29 SEC oversight of the New York Stock
Exchange gave the Commission the potential power to affect cor-
porate governance indirectly because of the Exchange's policies
20. Berle, Corporate Managers, supra note 14, at 1367-68.
21. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)).
22. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
23. 1933 Act §§ 5-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77m.
24. 1933 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa; 1934 Act § 13(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2).
25. 1934 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
26. W.O. DOUGLAS, Go EAsT, YOUNG MAN 272 (1974).
27. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6
(1982)).
28. Ch. 686, 54 Stat 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64
(1982)).
29. Section 10(a) provides: "No registered investment company shall have a board
of directors more than 60 per centuim of the members of which are persons who are
interested persons of such registered company." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1982).
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with regard to listing.30 Although other federal legislation of the
period contained certain negative prohibitions,3' there was no fed-
eral statutory control of corporate directors. This pragmatic com-
promise between proponents of direct federal control over
corporations through chartering and those who sought to leave all
regulation of corporations to the states remained in effect for the
next quarter of a century. During the 1940s, 1950s, and early
1960s, business generally prospered and so did shareholders.
There was little clamor for corporate reform.
In the mid-1960s and throughout the 1970s, the debate over cor-
porate governance resumed in a context of economic and political
upheaval that was different from the 1930s but certainly as disrup-
tive.32 The Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal eroded public
confidence in government. Public confidence in business also
dropped precipitously because of the perceived corrupt alliance
between corporate managers and politicians in the wake of federal
election law and sensitive payment scandals. In addition, Ameri-
can business entered into a long-term restructuring that is still
ongoing and therefore difficult to understand and analyze fully.
Clearly, however, the country's mature smokestack industries suf-
fered a period of relative decline just as the post World War II
baby boom entered the workplace. In reaction to these events, the
stock market endured a long-term bear cycle. Accordingly, stock-
holders became as disgruntled as the rest of the public.
The SEC played a key role as a catalyst for corporate gover-
nance reform throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The first SEC case
to address the issue of management integrity, afterwards utilized
as a precedent for the Commission's management fraud program,
was In re Franchard Corporation.33 Franchard involved a stop or-
der suspending the effectiveness of registration statements that
the SEC deemed materially deficient because of failure to disclose
the use of company funds for the personal benefit of the issuer's
chief executive officer. In a statement that became a keystone of
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 6, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s. See supra note
11; see also An In-Depth Analysis of the Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corpo-
rate Managemen4 31 Bus. LAw. 863, 1096 (1976) (assertion by symposium participant
that the Act may give the SEC full authority to establish federal law for those corpo-
rations listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange).
31. See, e.g., Banking Act of 1933 § 32, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982), which provides that
no director of any corporation "engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public
sale, or distribution... of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities" shall also serve
as a director of a member bank of the Federal Reserve Board.
32. See generally SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., CONFIDENCE AND CONCERN: CITI-
ZENS VIEw AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (Comm. Print 1973); T. H. WHITE, BREACH OF
FAIrH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (1975).
33. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964).
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future SEC programs, the SEC asserted that disclosure of the
chief executive officer's continual diversion of funds to the use of
his wholly owned corporation was "germane to an evaluation of
the integrity of his management. This quality is always a material
factor."34
However, the Franchard decision did not depart from tradi-
tional state law fiduciary concepts. 35 Furthermore, because of the
egregious breach of duty involved, the SEC could claim that fail-
ure to disclose constituted a material omission under federal se-
curities laws. These laws had long been used to make disclosure a
prophylactic for corporate reform without any claim that the SEC
could regulate the substantive conduct of corporate affairs by cor-
porate managers. At this time, however, the federal judiciary
seized upon Rule lOb-5,36 promulgated under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, as a mechanism for developing a federal corpo-
ration law. Utilizing an implied private right of action,37 the Court
strengthened the fiduciary obligations of managers to sharehold-
ers. The SEC participated in this process through administrative
rulings, injunctive actions, and amicus curiae briefs.38 These de-
velopments did not affect corporate governance as such, but nev-
ertheless provided a foundation for the view that a federal law
regulating the conduct of managers of large publicly held corpora-
tions was appropriate.
In 1973, as a result of the work of the Watergate special prosecu-
tor, several corporations and executive officers were charged with
using corporate funds for illegal domestic political contributions. 39
The SEC first published a statement that nondisclosure of these
34. 1d. at 172.
35. See id. at 176 (the diligence of directors is to be evaluated in the light of stan-
dards established by state statutory and common law).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
37. Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1974); see also J. I. Case v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-35 (1964) (implying a private cause of action under rule 14a).
38. One SEC critic, writing in 1965, justified these developments as follows:
The growth of the federal law of corporations... has been necessary and
its direction predictable. The legislative history demonstrates that the fed-
eral securities laws were intended to have a strong and pervasive impact.
Congress acted in 1933 and 1934 at a time of grave national economic crisis
and widespread abuses in the securities markets. A federal law was re-
quired to cope with the interstate operations of business and the securities
markets if workable rules were to be developed. The preamble to the Ex-
change Act proclaims that a healthy securities market is important for the
economy and the national well-being. The securities laws were designed
to produce fair and honest markets, and to restore investor confidence by
requiring high standards of conduct in securities transactions.
Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1174-75
(1965) (footnotes omitted).
39. See Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Priorities
and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-38
(1976) (testimony and prepared statement of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings]; See also SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS &
PRACTICES, SUBMITTED TO SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong.,
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matters might involve violations of the federal securities laws,
then brought enforcement actions against nine corporations that
made illegal political contributions. 40 These investigations in turn
led to the "questionable foreign payments" cases, which involved
various payments to foreign government officials to obtain or keep
business abroad.4 '
Because of the magnitude of the cases uncovered and the ques-
tions raised as to the legality of these payments under either the
federal securities laws or the laws of the foreign countries in-
volved, the SEC adopted a program of "voluntary" disclosure.
Under this program, the SEC indicated it would not prosecute is-
suers who voluntarily disclosed reports of investigations into sen-
sitive payments. The SEC took the position that corporations had
to disclose sensitive payments regardless of the amount involved
on the grounds that these matters related to management integ-
rity.4 In some of these cases, the SEC obtained consent injunc-
tions that resulted in the restructuring of particular corporate
boards. 4
3
Against this backdrop and the general post-Watergate hysteria
that prevailed in Washington, the corporate governance debate of
the 1930s was resurrected. The SEC played a major role in its re-
birth. The Commission's Division of Enforcement set the stage
through its widely publicized program regarding sensitive pay-
ments44 and its long series of injunctive actions requiring corpora-
tions to conduct internal corporate investigations and to structure
their boards.45
Consumer activist Ralph Nader also advocated the concession
theory. He led the school that viewed corporations as state agen-
cies that enjoy special privileges in order to achieve social or na-
40. E.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. ITIr Corp., 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
t 96,948 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1979); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Lockheed, [1975-76
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,509 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976); See Joint
Hearings, supra note 39, at 13-15.
41. E.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. ITT Corp., 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96, 948 (D.D.C. Aug 8, 1979); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Lockheed, [1975-76
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 95,509 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976); See Joint
Hearings, supra note 39, at 13-15; See generally Note, Disclosures of Payments to For-
eign Officials under the Securities Acts, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1848 (1976) (discussing legal
history of "questionable foreign payments" cases and possible legal standards and
their rationales).
42. See Joint Hearings, supra note 39, at 16-18. According to the SEC Report on
Questionable Payments, over one hundred corporations responded under this pro-
gram. See SEC REPORT ON QUE TIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 39, tables attached
at end.
43. See SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 39, at 3-5.
44. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
45. Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques: Expanding and Exotic Forms of
Ancillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637 (1975).
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tional ends.46 According to Mr. Nader, the consensual economic
cornerstone for corporate privilege had crumbled because of the
breakdown of controls that historically legitimized corporate
power. These controls47 were to insure that corporations effi-
ciently and responsibly served the public interest. However, they
all had failed to prevent irresponsible and unlawful conduct by
corporate executives, and therefore giant multinational corpora-
tions had become private governments, exercising a detrimental
influence on the quality of life for which they were not being held
accountable.48 Mr. Nader prescribed federal chartering of corpo-
rations to restructure the board of directors, to redefine its rela-
tions with managers, employees, shareholders, and the
community, and to regulate corporate disclosure and conduct in
certain areas of social concern.49
The Nader school blamed corporations for virtually all of the
ills of our post-industrial, technological society ranging from pol-
lution to unemployment. The remedy advocated was sweeping re-
form at the federal level to give the government direct power to
control and perhaps even to appoint corporate managers who
would work for the public interest.50 New York Congressman
Ben Rosenthal introduced legislation to further this objective in
the House of Representatives: the Corporate Democracy Act of
1980.51 Although the bill proposed to increase shareholder and di-
rector participation in company decision making, it also served
constituencies other than, and sometimes in conflict with, share-
holders. However, the bill attracted almost no interest in
Congress and died.
Another school of reform advocates focused upon the poor eco-
nomic performance of American business and perceived abuses of
trust by corporate managers. Their inquiry addressed discrepan-
cies between theoretical models of corporate law and actual condi-
tions. Professor Melvin Eisenberg, one of this school's foremost
legal theorists, comprehensively analyzed corporate structure in
The Structure of the Corporation.52 Professor Eisenberg observed
that virtually all state corporation laws provide that the board of
directors owe a duty to manage the business and affairs of the cor-
poration. He then focused on the differences he perceived in large
corporations between the statutory legal model and the actual
working model. Under the statutory model, the board takes an
active hand in selecting officers, setting business policy, supervis-
ing and monitoring corporate executives, and generally managing
46. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 62-71
(1976).
47. Mr. Nader specifically listed state chartering, competition, remedial law, fed-
eral regulation, labor unions, shareholders, and the board of directors. Id. at 63-64.
48. Id. at 63-64.
49. Id. at 75-236.
50. Id at 247-49.
51. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
52. M. EISENBERG, THE STRucTuRE OF THE CORPORATION (1976).
VOL. 52:534
Independent Corporate Boards
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the corporation. Under the working model, the board is only in a
position to supervise and monitor and, for the most part, does
neither effectively. In today's large and complex corporations,
which require substantial time and effort to manage, the board
takes no active hand in directing the operation of the
corporation.53
Professor Eisenberg therefore formulated a model for reform,
the monitoring model. He argued that because a corporate organ
comprised substantially of nonexecutives can rarely either man-
age the corporation's business or make policy, the board should
primarily advise management, approve of major corporate
projects and, most importantly, supervise, monitor, and select ex-
ecutive management. Professor Eisenberg concluded that the
legal rules governing the structure of corporate management
should ensure the effective performance of these functions by the
board. Thus, he argued, the rules must make the board independ-
ent of the executives whose performance they monitor, and assure
that the board receives adequate and objective information to en-
able it to execute its monitoring function.M
Another influential voice in the recent corporate governance
debate was that of Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC from
1977 to 1981. Chairman Williams recommended that corporations
"explore" the role and number of inside directors on corporate
boards because "directors who have business links to the corpora-
tion impose a cost on the accountability process, and we need to
consider carefully in each situation whether that cost is a neces-
sary one to incur, and whether the benefits can be achieved in
other ways. '55 Chairman Williams further asserted that the chief
executive officer should not serve as chairman of the board be-
cause managers should not control the substance and purpose of
the board's deliberations. He recommended that at least the
board's nominating and audit committees, key elements in corpo-
rate governance, should be composed of independent directors.
It has been persuasively argued that Chairman Williams came
out "four square for [Professor Dodd's] managerialist point of
view. '57 He believed that although large corporations are theoret-
ically owned by their shareholders, they have ceased to be private
53. Id at 137-48.
54. id at 149-70.
55. Williams, Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power, in THE 1979
BENJAMIN F. FAIRLESS MEMORIAL LECTURES: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 8 (1979).
56. 1d. at 18-19.
57. Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW.
173, 183 (1981). See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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property and have become quasi-public institutions.58 Yet, the dif-
ference between Professors Berle and Dodd as to the public obli-
gations of large corporations is not as great as it probably appeared
at the time,59 and Chairman Williams did not favor federal char-
tering legislation.60 Rather, he argued that a more long-term pub-
lic perspective on the part of corporate managers furthered the
short-term interest of investors and shareholders. 61
The real distinction between the Eisenberg-Williams perspec-
tive on corporate governance and the Nader perspective involves
the role of the federal government. Chairman Williams advocated
the use of independent directors as an alternative to federal char-
tering.62 Like Professor Berle, Chairman Williams and Professor
Eisenberg believed that strengthening the procedural mechanisms
for controlling corporate managers would allow corporation law to
remain primarily a matter of private property interests.63
Somewhere in the middle between Ralph Nader, on the one
hand, and Harold Williams, on the other, were Professor William
Cary, a former SEC Chairman, and Professor Donald Schwartz.
Both urged passage of a federal minimum standards act to protect
shareholder rights without federal chartering.6
III Proposals Regarding Board Composition and Director
Independence
It was in this atmosphere of intellectual ferment - necessarily
summarized briefly and perhaps only simplistically here - that
the corporate governance debate turned to the question of board
composition and director independence.
Neither federal nor state law in the United States has ever dic-
tated the composition of boards of directors, nor has the law at-
tempted to define necessary qualifications for directors of publicly
held corporations. 65 To the extent that public boards moved in the
direction of having outside directors, they have done so not in re-
sponse to any legal requirement. Rather, this development has
been the result of business practice that appears appropriate in the
light of present economic and political circumstances. Neverthe-
less, the trend towards independent directors has not occurred in a
vacuum. Especially during the past ten years, the SEC, the New
York Stock Exchange, the American Bar Association, and the
58. Williams, supra note 55, at 12.
59. See Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64
COLU M. L. REV. 1458, 1465 (1964).
60. Williams, supra note 55, at 21.
61. Id. at 23-24.
62. Id. at 19.
63. Id. at 20.
64. Cary, Federalism, supra note 9, at 700-04; Schwartz, The Paradigm of Federal
Chartering, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRucTuRE AND GOVERNANCE, THE
ALI-ABA SyMposiums 1977-1978 325, 336 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979).
65. But see Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1982) (requir-
ing at least 40% of Board members be disinterested).
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Business Roundtable have encouraged companies to employ
outside directors.
The SEC recommended that corporations form committees
composed of independent directors as early as 1940.66 However, no
regulatory action on the subject was taken until 1972, when the
SEC issued a release that concluded with the statement that "the
Commission endorses ... the establishment by all publicly-held
companies of audit commitees composed of outside direc-
tors ..... ,,67 A year later, the New York Stock Exchange strongly
recommended that each listed company form an audit committee,
preferably composed exclusively of independent directors.68 In
1974, the SEC restated its support for independent audit commit-
tees by amending its rules to require disclosure in proxy state-
ments of the existence or absence of an audit committee.69 In
1976, in response to the SEC's investigation into questionable cor-
porate payments and practices and in particular to the uncovering
of falsified corporate records and the use of slush funds, the Chair-
man of the SEC suggested that the New York Stock Exchange
"take the lead in this area by appropriately revising its listing re-
quirements, thus providing a practical means effecting... impor-
tant objectives without increasing direct government regulation."
On March 9, 1977, the SEC approved the new Exchange rule re-
quiring all listed domestic companies to "establish... and main-
tain audit committees comprised solely of directors independent of
management and free from 4ny relationship that ... would inter-
fere with their exercise of independent judgment as a committee
member."70
In April, 1977, when Harold Williams became Chairman of the
Commission, the SEC announced that it would hold public hear-
ings concerning shareholder communications, shareholder partici-
pation in the corporate electoral process, and corporate
governance in general.71 These hearings, held in four cities
around the country, lasted for many months. Following the hear-
66. In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., [Accounting Series Release Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 72,020, at 62,104, 62,108 (Nov. 19, Dec. 5, 1940).
67. Standing Audit Committees Composed of Outside Directors, [1971-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) t 78,670, at 81,424 (No. 9548, Mar. 23, 1972).
68. See SEA Release No. 13,346, supra note 11, at 1946 n.9.
69. Notice of Amendments to Require Increased Disclosure of Relationships Be-
tween Registrants and Their Independent Public Accountants, 40 Fed. Reg. 1010
(1974), reprinted in [Accounting Series Release Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 72,187, at 62,394 (No. 11147, Dec. 20, 1974).
70. Letter from Roderick M. Hills to M. Balten (May 11, 1976), reprinted in SEC
REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 39, at Exhibit D. The rule appears
in SEA Release No. 13,346, supra note 11, at 1945. The requirement took effect June
30, 1978.
71. Re-examination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Share-
holder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance
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ings, the Commission engaged in a number of rulemaking pro-
ceedings concerning the proxy rules. Although these rules
required increased public disclosure of board composition and
board committees, none of the SEC's rulemaking proceedings en-
deavored to regulate the substantive composition of the board.72
The staff report on the hearings concluded: "The board of direc-
tors has come to be viewed by many as the center of efforts to
enhance corporate accountability. With an increased number of
truly independent directors and an effectively functioning com-
mittee system, an institutionalized process for holding manage-
ment accountable will be created. '73 Nevertheless, the report did
not include any legal recommendations as to whether or how to
create a board composed of independent directors controlling the
nominating process.
During this period, the SEC's disclosure policies strongly en-
couraged public corporations to create boards composed of in-
dependent directors and establish committee systems in which
independent directors predominated. In a rulemaking proposal in
1978, the Commission expressed its view that boards should be
composed of independent directors, as strictly defined.74 The pro-
posal also would have mandated disclosure of whether the issuer
had standing audit, nominating, and compensation committees
composed of independent directors. The rules eventually issued
by the Commission differed in certain significant respects from
the original proposal on the definition of "independent" director.75
Nevertheless, they were intended to move corporations in the di-
rection of independent boards.
In reaction to the SEC's corporate governance hearings and to
threats of corporate chartering legislation, the business commu-
nity and corporate lawyers began considering voluntary measures
that might ward off federal legislation. A number of high level
conferences were held in the late 1970s, and two significant state-
ments were issued. In November 1976, a subcommittee of the Cor-
poration, Banking, and Business Law Committee of the American
Bar Association issued the Corporate Director's Guidebook,
Generally, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (1977), reprinted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,130, at 87,889, 87,890 (No. 13482, Apr. 28, 1977).
72. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether the SEC has any authority to do so.
73. SEC Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, printed for use of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 579 (Sept. 4,
1980) (footnote omitted).
74. Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Partic-
ipation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, 43
Fed. Reg. 31,945 (1978), reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
q 81,645, at 80,574, 80,578 (No. 34-14970, July 18, 1978). "Independent director" was
defined as "any person who is neither a 'management director' nor an 'affiliated non-
management director."'
75. Rather than adopting specific categories, the rules required a brief description
of significant economic and personal relationships between the director and the is-
suer. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Elec-
toral Process and Corporate Governance Generally; Final Rules, [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,766 at 81,086 (No. 15384, Dec. 6,1978) (codified at
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1977)).
VOL. 52:534
Independent Corporate Boards
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
designed to assist corporate directors in performing their duties.76
The Guidebook included a proposed model for the boards of direc-
tors of publicly owned corporations that distinguished between
management and nonmanagement directors.7 7 However, it stated
that the model did not represent a "definitive recommendation for
board structure such that continuance or adoption of differing pro-
cedures would or should place in question compliance with legal
norms or contemporary practices."78
Under the Guidebook's model, a director was classified as a
management director if he devoted substantially all of his atten-
tion to the affairs of the corporation, one of its subsidiaries, or any
subsidiary. This definition included former officers or employees.
The Guidebook classified all other directors as nonmanagement
directors, then as affiliated or unaffiliated nonmanagement direc-
tors.7 9 The Guidebook recommended that nonmanagement direc-
tors constitute a majority of the full board of directors.8 0 It
advocated formation of at least three working committees to exer-
cise the most common recurring needs for disinterested oversight:
a nominating committee composed exclusively of unaffiliated non-
management directors, a compensation committee composed of
nonmanagement directors, a majority of whom should be unaffili-
ated, and an audit committee composed of nonmanagement direc-
tors, a majority of whom should be unaffiliated.81
The Business Roundtable issued a report on the composition of
corporate boards of directors in 1978.82 This report's perspective,
as might be expected, was more pragmatic and less legalistic than
the Guidebook. The report contended that economic and political
power have been separated in the United States and that corpo-
rate legitimacy stems from economic success, not "some royal
franchise. '83 Directors needed the critical qualities of integrity,
independence, an inquiring mind, vision, an ability to work with
others, and broad experience. Managerial experience in other
businesses was particularly relevant because of corporations' sta-
tus as primarily economic instruments. Directors from outside the
76. American Bar Association Comm. on Corp. Laws, The Corporate Director's
Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976).
77. Id at 31-32.
78. Id at 31.
79. A director was regarded as an affiliated nonmanagement director if he en-
gaged in material transactions with the corporation or if he had close family ties to a
member of key management. Id
80. Id at 33.
81. Id. at 35-36.
82. Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the
Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation (January 1978).
83. Id. at 2.
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business community, however, also served some purpose.8 The
Business Roundtable Statement rejected any rule disqualifying all
members of operating management except the chief executive of-
ficer as directors, 5 but recommended instead that outsiders
should have a substantial impact on the board's decision making
process: "We note the strong tendency of U.S. business corpora-
tions to move toward a board structure based on a majority of
outside directors - and we endorse it."'86
IV. The ALI's Proposal And Its Critics
During this debate over corporate governance and reform, the
ALI authorized a corporate governance project, under the leader-
ship of former SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. 7 Chairman
Garrett's articulation of the Project's methodology paved the way
for the furor that developed over Tentative Draft No. l's black-
letter requirements for an independent board of directors:
Where there is no judicial authority, or where the cases are un-
satisfactory by modern standards - either because of their an-
tiquity, or absence of compelling analysis, or because they just
seem wrong - resort must be had to other sources. These may
include the literature on the subject, the better corporate prac-
tice in the view of those experienced in the field, not limited to
lawyers, and ultimately the judgement of the Institute, aided by
the Reporter and his Advisers. Where the project is not in fact
restating the cases, the Institute's views should take the form of
recommendations, which may include recommended statutory
provisions, state or federal.8 8
Board structure, however, is not a matter that has been, or by its
nature can be dictated by judicial decisions. State law does not
require a particular kind of board composition. Neither, gener-
ally, does federal law, with the peculiar exception of the Invest-
ment Company Act. 9 Thus, the board structure sections fall
squarely into the grey area where the Project does "not in fact
restat[e] the cases." Yet, Tentative Draft No. 1 clearly established
black-letter requirements.90 Critical attacks upon the draft by the
Business Roundtable and counsel to many large public corpora-
84. d. at 17.
85. Id. at 19.
86. Id. at 20.
87. Kripke, supra note 57, at 175.
88. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at viii.
89. See supra note 65.
90. The "black letter" law of Tentative Draft No. 1 stated:
§ 3.03. Composition of the Board of Directors
(a) Corporate law should provide that at least a majority of the directors
of a large publicly held corporation [§ 1.15] shall be free of any significant
relationships [§ 1.24] with the corporation's senior executives [§ 1.23], un-
less a majority of the corporation's voting securities [§ 1.27] are owned by a
single person [§ 1.18] or a family group [§ 1.13].
(b) As a matter of good corporate practice, a publicly held corporation
[§ 1.21] that is not required, under subdivision (a), to have a majority of
directors who are free of any significant relationships with the corpora-
tion's senior executives, should have at least three such directors.
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tions9l and heated debate within the ALI and consultants and ad-
visors to the Project led not only to a title change for the entire
Project,92 but also to substantially toned-down recommendations
for board structure in Tentative Draft No. 2.93
The comment to Tentative Draft No. 2, section 3.04, traces the
sources of the board composition sections in legal precedent and
theory.94 It readily concedes that present law generally makes no
provisions for the composition of the board. It refers to the Invest-
ment Company Act, which requires that forty percent of the direc-
tors of a registered investment company not be "interested"
persons,95 to the New York Stock Exchange requirement that at
least two independent directors for listed companies sit on the
board,9 to the Business Roundtable's Statement, and to the Cor-
porate Director's GuidebooP.97 The comment provides that volun-
tary corporate action would implement section 3.04.
The ALI's proposals seek to enhance the oversight function of
the board; this goal in turn has two prerequisites: a board that can
objectively evaluate the performance of the senior executives, and
an accurate and reliable flow of information to the board concern-
ing executive performance.98 This reasoning, which applies both
to independent directors and particularly to independent audit
committees, 99 is consistent with Professor Eisenberg's monitoring
91. See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
93. § 3.04. Directors Who Have No Significant Relationship to the Senior
Executives.
It is recommended as a matter of corporate practice that:
(a) The board of every large publicly held corporation [§ 1.16] should have
a majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship [§ 1.26]
with the corporation's senior executives [§ 1.25], unless a majority of the
corporations's voting securities [§ 1.29] are owned by a single person, a
family group [§ 1.13], or a control group [§ 1.06].
(b) The board of a publicly held corporation [§ 1.23] that does not fall
within Subsection (a) should have at least three directors who are free of
any significant relationship with the corporation's senior executives.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2.
94. See id at 84.
95. IM (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1981)).
96. Id This is related to the Exchange's policy on audit committees. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
97. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, at 84. See supra notes 76-80 and accompa-
nying text.
98. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 3.04 comment, at 85.
99. The provisions concerning audit committees were developed and regarded as a
mechanism for overseeing and strengthening the audit process. Tentative Draft No. 2
specifically provides that every large corporation should have an audit committee
composed of at least three significant directors, a majority of whom have no signifi-
cant relationship with the corporations senior executives. Id § 3.03, at 76. The com-
ment to this section recognizes that an audit committee is not now required as a
matter of state law, with one exception. Id- (The exception is Connecticut). However,
the NYSE requires listed companies to have an audit committee composed of in-
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model for corporations.100
However, many prominent scholars have rejected the monitor-
ing model of corporate structure requiring a board of independent
directors to protect shareholders by limiting the power of corpo-
rate managers. Professor Daniel Fischel argues that the monitor-
ing model is based on the premise that corporations have failed to
meet their responsibilities to shareholders and the public, but
that, in fact, no empirical evidence supports this conclusion:
Despite the near consensus that improved corporate governance
is necessary, critics have proffered no evidence to demonstrate
that any problem exists. Many reformers, as their proposals re-
flect, either ignore or misunderstand the economics of the cor-
porate form of firm organization and the market forces that
limit the divergence of interest between managers and inves-
tors. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the corporate
governance movement, despite its durability and widely held
support, is much ado about nothing.' 0 '
Professor Walter Werner criticizes the monitoring model as
based on the incorrect view that shareholders once participated in
the control of public corporations and should be restored to such
control by revitalized shareholder democracy:
Shareholders are seen as citizens of a state, determining the
destiny of the enterprise through directors, the corporate legis-
lature, whom they elect to operate it on their behalf. Corpora-
tions grew large, according to this doctrine, because the law's
constraints on corporate scope and shareholder constraints on
directors' power were eroded. Since the law did not distinguish
between close and public corporations, the erosion doctrine also
makes no distinction. It therefore ignores the effect of securi-
ties markets on the ownership and governance of public corpo-
rations as though those markets had never existed. 02
Professor Werner argues that in fact "public corporations have
always pursued a goal of profitability and have always been owned
by shareholders chasing their own private gain."' 03 These profit-
oriented shareholders are not interested in the credentials of di-
rectors or corporate democracy. Instead, they rate the perform-
ance of management and vote by purchasing and selling shares.
In addition, Professor Werner points out that the major exam-
ple of governance failure given by the reformers - the sensitive
payments scandals - was an instance where management and
shareholder interests coincided but conflicted with society's inter-
dependent directors. See supra note 70. The comment to section 3.03 of Tentative
Draft No. 2 states "[S]ection 3.03 would be an appropriate subject for legislative action
in connection with a general modernization of a state's corporation statute." IcL at 77.
100. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
101. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movemen4 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,1291-92
(1982).
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ests. 10 4 Accordingly, boards of independent directors would not
have achieved greater shareholder protection. Indeed, Professor
Werner opines that the monitoring model's emphasis on the inter-
ests of society may result in reforms inimical to shareholders'
interests.105
Professor Victor Brudney attacks the independent-director
model on the ground that the very quality of directorial indepen-
dence makes directors ineffectual instruments for enforcing man-
agement integrity or performance.10 6 Outsiders simply do not
have the time, knowledge, or incentive to perform that role, ac-
cording to Professor Brudney. Furthermore, when "the independ-
ent director seeks to monitor corporate social responsibility, he
faces larger difficulties and smaller likelihood of overcoming them
than in matters of assuring managerial integrity or efficiency.' '10 7
The most acrimonious objections to the Project's formulations
concerning board structure and composition have come from the
Business Roundtable, which prepared a statement in opposition to
Tentative Draft No. 1.108 In the Roundtable's view, the Project
proposes significant changes in current law, while using the form
of a traditional Restatement. The Roundtable's Statement em-
phasizes that the Project recommends new law and formulates
black-letter rules in spite of conflicting case law and that the Re-
porter's model imposes duties not required under current law. 0 9
The Roundtable also attacks the Project's choice of one model of
corporate governance, the monitoring model, to the exclusion of
all others, and criticizes the Project's failure to consult and rely
upon disciplines outside the law, especially business school re-
search and economic data."10 Regarding the merits of the Project's
theories on board composition, the Roundtable's Statement criti-
cizes the Project for imposing "new rules and regulations on
United States corporations which will serve only to decrease the
risk-taking and flexibility critical for corporate survival.""'
Some in the ALI have taken umbrage at the Roundtable's at-
tack on legalistic and regulatory solutions to corporate govern-
104. See Werner, Managemen Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and
Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 388, 409-13 (1977).
105. See Werner, supra note 102, at 1663-66.
106. See Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Vil-
lage?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 616-22, 642-59 (1982).
107. Id. at 639.
108. Statement of The Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute's Pro-
posed 'rinciples of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recom-
mendations" (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Statement of the Business Roundtable
(Feb. 1983)].
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id. at 20-27.
111. Id at 35.
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ance. Yet, the Project presumes the existence of a conflict of
interest between management and shareholders, to be resolved by
independent boards. This adversarial approach to corporate gov-
ernance, although appropriate for political bodies, is simply not
consonant with normal corporate culture. Corporate boards gen-
erally act by consensus, led by the chief executive officer. Corpo-
rations value efficiency and profit rather than equity and fairness.
Whether the accountability mechanism of an independent board is
worth the economic cost is a question that the corporate gover-
nance debates on the Project have given short shrift.112
Perhaps this question has not been explored because propo-
nents of the monitoring model generally advocate an amelioration
of the corporate objective to pursue profit. 113 For this reason, crit-
ics of the monitoring model have expressed the view that its most
serious defect is the notion that independent directors can recon-
cile business and social goals. According to Professor Homer
Kripke, the recommended corporate governance reforms are di-
rected toward "the preemption of state corporate law in the en-
forcement of the [SEC's] managerialist program.11 4 Professor
Kripke attacks this program as, in the final analysis, inimical to
shareholders:
The crucial choices for our future are economic: how to deal
with union efforts to protect jobs against automation, new prod-
ucts, imported products, beginners who cannot earn the mini-
mum wage, runaway shops; when to adopt a cold-turkey cure for
losses by abandoning a product or closing a plant; when to man-
ufacture in overseas low-wage platforms. These will be agoniz-
ing choices. There is no reason to think that present
managements and boards can make these choices less well than
112. See generally Butler & Baysinger, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corpora-
tion Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 53 GEO WASH. L. REV. 557.
113. The Project itself is somewhat ambiguous on the question of whether and to
what extent business corporations should exercise social responsibility. Nevertheless,
it rejects the notion that managers and directors are only obligated to maximize inves-
tor wealth without balancing in social or moral responsibility. Tentative Draft No. 2
provides:
§ 2.01. The Objective and Conduct of the Business Corporation
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of busi-
ness activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain, except that, whether or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are
thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law,
(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably re-
garded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, and
(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, hu-
manitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, at 25.
The controversy over this provision is not surprising, and the ALI's reluctance, fre-
quently exhibited since the Project began, to debate fully the Project's premises and
purposes seems inappropriate. After all, the monitoring model is only a mechanism.
The real question is whether the Project is designed to protect shareholders or soci-
ety. As Professor Brudney states, "the argument for the independent director rarely
disentangles his possible roles - as a monitor of integrity, efficiency, or social respon-
sibility - or the logic supporting each of them." Brudney, supra note 106, at 658.
114. Kripke, supra note 57, at 204.
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outsiders who can cheaply make themselves momentary heroes
to the community at stockholders' expense.11 5
Some critics of the monitoring model, like Professor Brudney,
take the position that independent directors constitute a poor sub-
stitute for government regulation because independent directors
will probably provide less protection for consumers, suppliers,
workers, and the general public.116 Others, like Professor Fischel,
argue that the marketplace will appropriately discipline business
corporations, and that requiring boards to consist primarily of in-
dependent directors to compel socially responsible behavior "has
the effect of obliterating the distinction between a firm - a nexus
of contracts voluntarily and lawfully entered into by individuals to
maximize their joint welfare - and a public body serving the pub-
lic interest .... ,17 Together, the critics suggest that the in-
dependent board as a surrogate for the legislature in determining
public policy is likely to do a poor job, both economically and
politically.
The most stringent of the board composition and structure pro-
visions of the Project are aimed at the large publicly held corpora-
tion, defined as a corporation with 2000 or more holders of record
and $100 million in total assets." 8 While such companies probably
adhere to the independent board model more frequently than
smaller, newly emerging companies, it is ironic that mature public
enterprise is the sector of the American economy that is in the
most difficulty today. This should give proponents of the monitor-
ing model some pause.
Reformers generally assume that new procedural mechanisms
will push public bodies in directions that are politically compatible
with their views. To the contrary, governance changes are just as
likely to be used by corporate managers for their own ends as to
further the ends of shareholders or society. For example, taking
employee and community needs into account could be used by
some managers as a justification for resisting tender offers that
would have been in the best interests of shareholders. Similarly,
an independent board structure, in conjunction with the business
judgment rule, could be used aggressively to dispose of possibly
meritorious litigation.
The formulation of the monitoring model in Tentative Draft
No. 2 is essentially statutory. Although the ALI proposes that cor-
115. Id at 206.
116. Brudney, supra note 106, at 654. See also E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL,
CORPORATE PoWiE 283-89 (1981) (the benefits to society at large from independent
board representation are not likely to be great, because of a "tendency of outsiders to
accept the board/management concept of the function of the corporations").
117. Fischel, supra note 101, at 1285.
118. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 1.16, at 9.
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porations voluntarily follow the provisions regarding independent
boards, the ALI views its provisions regarding audit committees as
normative standards for legislatures to adopt by statute. The com-
ments to Tentative Draft No. 1 suggest that because statutes nor-
mally dictate the requirements, if any, concerning the composition
of the board, full implementation of the provisions regarding
board composition would require legislative action. Pending legis-
lative action, Tentative Draft No. 1 suggested that appropriate
self-regulatory organizations adopt a counterpart of the project's
provisions for large publicly held corporations within their
purview.119
Tentative Draft No. 2 represents a significant retreat from this
position because of its reliance on voluntary adherence rather
than statutory compulsion. However, this retreat appears more as
an accommodation of the criticisms of Tentative Draft No. 1 rather
than because of a belief that the provisions of Tentative Draft
No. 2 could become law through voluntary corporate action.
While in many situations good corporate practices can become law
through subsequent judicial decision making that elevates such
practice to a standard of care, it is hard to foresee how this could
happen with regard to the requirements concerning board compo-
sition and structure set forth in Tentative Draft No. 1. Although
the SEC has obtained the appointment of independent directors
by consent in order to settle certain enforcement cases,120 the pro-
priety of board restructuring by the federal courts under the se-
curities laws is highly questionable.' 21 One wonders then why the
ALI calls for voluntary change in board structure in the context of
a document that takes traditional restatement form and that ad-
mittedly is the proper subject of legislative enactment. It would
appear that this is simply the best the ALI can presently get. Ten-
tative Draft No. 2 is, in fact, a statement of principles for future
legislative enactment at a more politically opportune time.
V. Conclusion
As suggested above, despite a decade of clamor for reform of
corporate goverance, a political consensus for legislation mandat-
ing structural reform of corporate entities has not materialized.
Perhaps more troubling, in the context of the ALI's Project, is the
lack of an articulated theoretical predicate for the structural re-
forms advocated.
Some have criticized the ALI's deliberations as too legalistic and
not sufficiently practical, and challenged the Project's formula-
tions as too precise and inflexible at a time of dynamic change in
the corporate community. 22 A more telling criticism of the Pro-
119. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at 73.
120. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
121. Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Reme-
dies, 67 MINN. L. REv. 865, 933-41 (1983).
122. See, e.g., Statement of the Business Roundtable (Feb. 1983), supra note 108, at
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ject is that virtually the entire debate has involved specific provi-
sions rather than basic conceptual matters.
The question of what objective the independent board should
serve as a matter of legal theory has not received adequate atten-
tion. Is such a board intended to enforce the fiduciary duties of
corporate managers to shareholders, thereby encouraging greater
efficiency and integrity? Or, should it expand the horizons of the
public corporation so that boards weigh social needs against purely
business or economic needs? While this topic has been discussed
in connection with the Project's provisions on objectives and con-
duct of the public corporation, the relationship between the provi-
sions on corporate objectives and the provisions on the monitoring
model has not been clearly articulated. Furthermore, the debate
has ignored whether state law - which has deliberately permitted
free incorporation with only minimal structural requirements -
should continue to regulate matters of corporate structure. If, as
the Project implicitly suggests, an established national standard
should preempt state law for at least large publicly traded corpo-
rations, what public interest would that standard serve?
Professor Schwartz observes that: "Largely as a result of the
competitive federal system, the striking fact about corporation law
in the United States is that it lacks policy content. Even as to the
internal relationships among competing interests in the corpora-
tion, by and large, corporation law does not act as a regulator.' 23
He believes the "policy content of corporation law should seek to
balance the economic goals and social responsibilities of the corpo-
ration."'2 4 It appears that the ALI has determined to advocate the
monitoring model as a means of injecting a new policy content
into corporation law without calling for any discussion of the ne-
cessity or propriety of the change.
A discussion of big questions can bog down a deliberative body
like the ALI so that it settles or accomplishes nothing and pro-
duces no principles of corporate governance. However, the ALI
has refused to confront basic, real questions about the desirability
of structural reform of the modern corporation. Furthermore, the
ALI does its Project a disservice by denying that despite its
watered-down language, Tentative Draft No. 2, like Tentative
Draft No. 1, seeks to prescribe changes in corporation law. Per-
haps such change is necessary and appropriate, but perhaps it is
not. Surely this question is sufficiently significant to our economic
4 (given the dynamic climate of corporate governance, there is "insufficient experi-
ence in which to base a mandatory, black-letter model of corporate structure and
junction").
123. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 333.
124. Id- at 338.
1 OQA'
and political system to warrant open debate. Instead, the ALI has
presumed that change is required and the project has proceeded
accordingly.
Business corporations should be judged by their economic via-
bility, according to the values of the marketplace. If one can
demonstrate that an independent board will improve their ability
to provide jobs efficiently and deliver goods and services, thereby
increasing the total return to investors, then the monitoring
model deserves serious attention. This standard, however, is prob-
ably best enforced by the marketplace rather than by legislation.
Furthermore, social responsibility is the job of government, not
business.
If reformers advocate structural changes in order to orient pub-
lic corporations towards social goals, such reforms should be seri-
ously questioned. Corporations represent particular economic
interests and not the public interest. If a board of independent di-
rectors is legally required to take into account noneconomic objec-
tives, it is likely these objectives will be more compatible with the
social and political ideas of the business community than with the
aspirations of the general public affected by business corporations.
On the other hand, if reformers advance the monitoring model as
a means to protect investors, its proponents should explicitly artic-
ulate this purpose so that the validity of the independent board
model can be utilized and tested in connection with the future
work of the project on duty of care, business judgment, and
changes in corporate control.
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